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The intense attack on court-ordered busing rests largely on the
public belief that the courts are artificially interfering with normal
neighborhoods and communities. A central premise in the early
Supreme Court decisions was, however, that the courts were
attempting to correct violations with deep roots in both school and
housing discrimination. When the Court later decided to limit and
then to permit termination of desegregation, however, fundamen-
tally different conclusions about housing were relied on-that
housing segregation simply happened for some unknowable reason
or that it was a natural force, separate from schools, that courts
could do nothing about. The changing conception of housing,
often reached with little or no empirical basis, has provided a
principal grounds for judicial acceptance of segregated education.
To determine whether or not court-ordered desegregation in
urban areas is needed, justifiable, and feasible, courts must reach
decisions about urban residential segregation and its relationship to
schools. The radical change in the Supreme Court's understanding
of the relationship between school and housing segregation between
the early 1970s and the 1974 Milliken v. Bradley' decision, which
brought an end to significant increases in desegregation and locked
in the isolation of minority students in the metropolitan North,
provided a key element in the justification of a constitutional policy
that made desegregation a right without a remedy in the metro-
politan North, where virtually all major cities have large majorities
of nonwhite students who attend segregated and inferior schools.
The Milliken decision, blocking desegregation in the North, and
the 1991 and 1992 decisions, Board of Education v. Dowell2 and
Freeman v. Pitts,' permitting resegregation of southern school
districts, rest to a considerable degree on court findings about
housing segregation, theories that changed drastically as the courts
moved from requiring all-out urban desegregation within school
t Professor of Education and Social Policy, Graduate School of Education,
Harvard University.
1 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
2 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
s 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
(1397)
1398 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1397
districts to approving local decisions to send children back to
segregated schools. The changing description of housing and its
relationship to schools provided a central intellectual justification
for a sweeping reversal of legal conceptions.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Supreme Court set the
clear policy that where there was unconstitutional segregation there
must be full and immediate desegregation. This was the primary
and urgent goal. In Milliken the Court provided no remedy or,
worse, a counterproductive and very limited remedy for a clear
constitutional violation, futilely trying to desegregate black children
in an overwhelmingly black and rapidly changing city school district.
The primary constitutional value became the autonomy of the
suburban school districts rather than the correction of unconstitu-
tional segregation. This shift was made possible by a theory of
suburban innocence that excluded all discussion of how the Detroit
suburbs came to be among the nation's most rigidly segregated in
terms of housing and, therefore, in terms of schools.
Segregated urban school systems are built on a base of housing
segregation. The vast differences between inner-city and suburban
schools help determine where families with choices will live, as
people moving to a new metropolitan area will almost immediately
discover from realtors and relocation services. In many ways, the
struggle over urban desegregation has been an effort to reverse
some of the educational inequalities growing out of a comprehen-
sive system of urban segregation including schools, housing, and
employment. The system was rooted in a variety of public and
private forms of discrimination that operated for many decades and
have not been fundamentally changed by weak and very thinly
enforced fair housing laws.
The Supreme Court's change in fundamental understanding of
the role of housing in desegregation cases appeared suddenly
between 1973 and 1974, and was consolidated in the decisions of
the early 1990s. The new conclusions about housing radically
oversimplify the issues. The previous findings were actually closer
to the truth.
One of the most frequent findings in city school desegregation
cases is that the school districts have located schools and drawn
their attendance boundaries in ways that intensify segregation and
undermine integrated schools and neighborhoods. The Supreme
Court recognized the interaction of school and housing decisions in
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its first urban desegregation case, the 1971 Swan v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education4 decision:
The construction of new schools and the closing of old ones
are two of the most important functions of local school authorities
.... Over the long run, the consequences of the choices will be
far reaching. People gravitate toward school facilities, just as
schools are located in response to the needs of people. The
location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential
development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on
composition of inner-city neighborhoods
The first northern desegregation Supreme Court decision, Keyes
v. School District No. 1,6 rose directly out of issues related to neigh-
borhood residential change. In Denver an integrated neighborhood
called Park Hill feared that school boundary changes would result
in the resegregation of local schools while protecting outlying white
areas. Neighborhood leaders initiated the case to try to force
attendance boundaries that would support integration. This dispute
later became a city-wide lawsuit and produced the first Supreme
Court decision on desegregating northern cities.
The 1973 decision found that the Denver district's practices
labeled schools according to race and, pointing to school site-
selection and attendance boundaries that tended to resegregate an
integrated community, affected the racial makeup of neighborhoods
throughout the city's housing market. The complex interaction
between school and housing segregation with broader housing
effects was a key part of the Supreme Court's reasoning for
ordering city-wide desegregation on the basis of neighborhood level
violations:
First, it is obvious that a practice of concentrating Negroes in
certain schools by structuring attendance zones or designating
"feeder" schools on the basis of race has the reciprocal effect of
keeping other nearby schools predominantly white. Similarly, the
practice of building a school ... to a certain size and in a certain
location, "with conscious knowledge that it would be a segregated
school," ... has a substantial reciprocal effect on the racial
composition of other nearby schools. So also, the use of mobile
classrooms, the drafting of student transfer policies, the transpor-
tation of students, and the assignment of faculty and staff, on
4 402 U.S. 1 (1970).
5 d. at 20.
6 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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racially identifiable bases, have the clear effect of earmarking
schools according to their racial composition, and this, in turn,
together with the elements of student assignment and school
construction, may have a profound reciprocal effect on the racial
composition of residential neighborhoods within a metropolitan
area, thereby causing further racial concentration within the
schools. We recognized this in Swan ....
I. PROTECTING THE SUBURBS
What the Supreme Court recognized in Swann and Keyes it
forgot in Milliken, which came just a year after the Denver case.
Confronted with the decision whether to order desegregation across
metropolitan areas or to block it at the suburban boundary lines,
the Court faced an issue full of housing dimensions but totally
excluded housing from its decision, which made desegregation in
Detroit and many other large cities impossible. This decision
brought to an end the rapid growth of desegregated schooling for
black students since the mid-1960s and blocked any significant
desegregation for the soaring Latino population. The decision set
the stage for the resegregation cases of the 1990s.
The most important school decision for the North rested on a
majority opinion ignoring housing evidence in the record of a case
brought in one of the nation's most intensely segregated metro-
politan areas. Metropolitan Detroit had seen a great deal of govern-
mental action to foster segregated communities. Chief Justice
Burger's opinion for the five-member majority claimed that the
issue was not raised, although the issues were extensively addressed
in the trial and in the oral argument citing the evidence and trial
court findings on housing.
Since the early 1970s the courts and policymakers have increas-
ingly turned away from serious discussion of the system of urban
segregation. By the time of the resegregation decisions of the
1990s, housing came to be seen as a reason justifying reinstatement
of school segregation rather than part of a problem that required a
comprehensive solution.
As federal courts changed direction while continuing to affirm
the Brown v. Board of Education' decision, they explained that the
increasing segregation in many districts was not a public responsi-
7 Id. at 201-02 (footnotes and citations omitted).
8 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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bility, but a natural process reflecting private preferences. If
spreading segregation is natural and private, it is beyond the reach
of the courts and futile for them to try to change-and is therefore
an important justification for judicial inaction while schools are
resegregated.
II. SHIFTING THE BURDEN
Basic assumptions about urban change by the Supreme Court
majority in key decisions sustaining segregation, including Milliken
and the resegregation decisions of the 1990s, are in conflict with
much research on housing. The conclusions of some lower courts
in approving resegregation include findings that incorrectly
attribute all white enrollment decline to a busing plan when there
has been very similar enrollment change in similar cities without
busing plans and even in cities that restored neighborhood schools.
It is easy in most cities to show that housing segregation was
initiated and institutionalized with massive official support, that
most minority neighborhoods that were segregated remain segregat-
ed today, and that there are still great numbers living in racially
defined housing markets, although surveys show that very few
minority adults prefer to live in all-minority neighborhoods.
Segregation has been spreading on the borders of existing minority
communities since World War I.
If it is enough to show substantial evidence of historical and
current discrimination and an unbroken pattern of ghetto expan-
sion dating back to decades of overt discrimination, then housing
issues must always be considered in school desegregation cases. It
is easy to demonstrate various forms of housing discrimination
historically in most housing markets and to show that segregation
has been continuous. Some of the principal barriers to housing
integration, such as racial fears, the creation of racially defined
submarkets and real estate operations, and the unequal knowledge
about various communities, are clearly rooted in the history of
discrimination.
No one, however, can prove all the linkages between the past
and present. There are such imperfect measures of many of the key
forces, and so many other things changed in metropolitan areas as
the form of housing segregation evolved that there is no way to
scientifically prove how much of contemporary segregation is or is
not directly linked to historic violations. If the court requires
specific proof of the various linkages and specific evidence of the
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precise current impacts, it is setting an impossible standard of
proof, and the civil rights side will surely lose although there are
doubtless major linkages.
The courts in the resegregation cases often impose demanding
standards of proof for plaintiffs but make their own findings of fact
about housing by simple assertion. In some cases the courts reach
sweeping and extremely controversial conclusions about housing by
simply announcing them as if they were common sense. In others
they make findings about the causes of segregation on the basis of
surveys of racial attitudes, which cannot, in their nature, assess the
two fundamental legal issues: (i) the degree to which the attitudes
are a product of the history of discrimination and segregation; and
(ii) the degree to which they would change under a new policy.
Although surveys are often presented by school districts as if they
show natural preferences that constrain rather than result from
public policy, surveys cannot provide such answers. The attitudes
reported could well be partly shaped by previous housing segrega-
tion policies. Courts often take surveys and treat the attitudes as if
they are simply natural and permanent attitudes-a totally inappro-
priate use of survey data. If such standards had been used at the
time of the Brown decision, the fact that eighty-one percent of white
southerners believed the Court to be wrong would have been taken
as a justification for inaction, and we would have never known that
forty years later only fifteen percent of white southerners would
hold that attitude after experiencing the reality of the nation's most
integrated schools.
Sometimes the intellectual enterprise of the courts is even more
unfounded. A court may, for example, simply announce that all
historic housing violations that happened before the date the Fair
Housing Act9 was enacted in 1968 have no lasting effects because
the law canceled the effects of generations of overt discrimination.
These findings ignore the federal government's own research on the
persistence of discrimination in housing markets and the records
and studies showing the very slight enforcement of the Fair Housing
Act. Because the levels of segregation in many areas are little
changed, tests show continued discrimination, and because many of
the same subsidized projects are as segregated or more than before,
it is difficult to understand the basis for the findings.
' Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 801-19, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89
(codifed as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988)).
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A more moderate version of this approach might be called the
steadily vanishing violation theory. It simply asserts that historic
violations have diminishing effect with the passage of time. Instead
of assuming that the enactment of fair housing laws ended discrimi-
nation, it assumes that discrimination steadily declines and, over a
number of years, could be safely discounted. This theory also is
simply asserted. There is no empirical basis for asserting that the
passage of time solves discrimination and prejudice. In fact, racial
attitudes change in both directions.
Some courts raise even more extensive barriers to considering
the housing issues. In Swann the Supreme Court had noted that not
too much should be put into one case because a single case "can
carry only a limited amount of baggage." 10 This obscure phrase
gave lower courts a plausible way to dispose of even extremely
serious housing issues, while posing impossible barriers for civil
rights plaintiffs. If such plaintiffs bring in limited evidence, it will
not show the needed proof of continuing effects of past violations;
but if they try to prove the whole intricate history of metropolitan
discrimination in a housing market it may be dismissed as too much
"baggage." The Supreme Court, for example, affirmed lower court
decisions rejecting extremely extensive evidence on the intentional
residential segregation of metropolitan Atlanta partially on the
"baggage" theory. If the courts require evidence of a history of
discrimination in housing to integrate metropolitan schools in
residentially segregated communities and then dismisses extremely
powerful evidence as too complicated for the courts to think about,
plaintiffs confront a maze with no exit.
In its key decisions on resegregation, Dowell and Pitts, the
Supreme Court revisited the housing issue, but was deeply divided
on whether there was a relationship that could justify either courts
relinquishing jurisdiction over school systems or courts holding
school systems accountable for spreading residential segregation.
The Pitts case shows fundamental division on the housing issues in
"concurring opinions" expressing totally different understandings
of the basic relationship between schools and housing. The
justifications that the Court's majority appeared to rely on in the
resegregation cases included a mixture of switching the burden of
proof, assuming that time cured the effects of past discrimination,
and accepting the natural preferences theory of segregation on the
10 402 U.S. at 22.
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basis of surveys commissioned by lawyers attempting to end
desegregation orders.
The issue of housing deserves much more sophisticated
consideration because theories of housing change are very directly
related to decisions about ending school desegregation. If housing
segregation is caused or strongly affected by school desegregation
plans, then any plan for lasting integration must take housing into
account. If the courts, on the other hand, see housing segregation
as unrelated to school desegregation and essentially private, they are
likely to conclude that school officials may accept a "natural" spread
of residential segregation occurring through private choice and not
public action, and therefore to accept the spread of school segrega-
tion as natural. This is precisely the picture of housing painted by
school districts seeking permission to resegregate and accepted by
lower court judges.
At the other extreme would be clear proof of a variety of forms
of public action that greatly intensify housing and school segrega-
tion. Housing actions could include, for example, segregated
location and tenant assignment for subsidized housing projects;
administration of housing voucher and certificate programs in ways
that undermine and resegregate integrated neighborhoods; the use
of zoning power to block minority housing; and discrimination in
federally supervised mortgage lending institutions. Lack of sig-
nificant enforcement of fair housing laws in the face of blatant
housing discrimination would add to the case. All of these
problems could be compounded by school district decisions to build
new schools certain to be segregated, to downgrade the curriculum
in racially changing schools, and other actions contributing to
school and housing resegregation. This is the situation described
by civil rights lawyers and supported by a considerable body of
research. Repairing school segregation in this case would require
dealing with the effects of housing segregation or attacking housing
discrimination itself.
The school segregation that exists in any given community is
likely to reflect some complex combination of current discrimina-
tion in schools and housing, the enduring effects on practices,
inequalities, and expectations rooted in past discrimination, and the
effects of private prejudice and private preferences, which may
themselves be products of earlier discrimination.
The segregated schools that dominate metropolitan America in
the 1990s are primarily a reflection of persistent housing segrega-
tion. The serious segregation today is overwhelmingly among
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school districts rather than within school districts. Concentration
of three-fourths of the nation's residents and more than eighty
percent of minority students in metropolitan areas, fragmentation
of most of those areas into many school districts, and concentration
of the African-American and Latino students in a small number of
those districts produce and maintain segregation. Segregated
minority housing continues to spread, reaching out into important
sectors of some suburban rings, and the growth on the suburban
periphery continues to be in communities that are virtually all white.
The powerful role of housing and school district fragmentation
in contemporary school segregation raises very difficult questions
for courts attempting to realize the goals of Brown and Green v.
County School Board." Recognizing the linkages between schools
and housing, and working on their positive potentials will move us
toward the goal of successfully integrated communities with
naturally integrated and equitable schools-and will begin to
mobilize many kinds of policy toward that goal. We need policies,
for example, to recognize and support stably integrated neighbor-
hoods and to reward them with excellent "naturally integrated"
neighborhood schools. School districts need to have a role in
housing development decisions and housing developers need to
help integrate new neighborhoods. Subsidized housing vouchers,
as suggested by the Clinton Administration, need to be combined
with strong counseling to permit more of these families to obtain
housing in areas with excellent integrated schools.
There is ample experience now to devise mutually supportive
school and housing integration policies to overcome the remains of
generations of intentional segregation. Ironically, it may be that the
most complex and wide-ranging planning of school and housing
remedies will lead to the most natural, stable, and least coercive
outcome. If the courts choose, on the other hand, to use unsup-
ported presumptions and burden shifts about housing issues to
justify resegregation of schools, decades of commitment to the goals
of Brown will give way to quiet acceptance of segregated schools
serving segregated neighborhoods. Our courts have been attempt-
ing to use ill-founded theories about housing to justify turning back
to Plessy v. Ferguson'2 in metropolitan America. There is massive
evidence that this will lead only to the development of the kind of
"1391 U.S. 430 (1968).
12 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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"inherently unequal" schools the Court warned against in Brown. A
much better path is to accept the powerful public responsibility for
building and spreading the system of urban apartheid and to begin
to put in place remedies that could lead toward a more integrated
urban society.
